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THE AGGREGATION OF CONTROLS AND THE AUTONOMY OF SUBORDINATES* 
I. The Unique-Supervisee Problem: 
In contemporary economic systems, the great majority of people spend their 
working hours in a relation of subordination to one or more of the fellow-members 
of the organizations to which they belong. When their goals or preferences with 
respect to the outcomes of their activities in the organization diverge from 
those their superiors would like to see them pursue, their decisions are nor­
mally constrained by orders or rules limiting their "autonomy." How constraining 
these orders or rules may be will depend, in part, on the supervisors' perception 
of their performance--on the information that reaches supervisors about it. 
Supervisors, in general, have a limited capacity to collect, process, and act 
upon the detailed information available to their subordinates, They must make 
their decisions, therefore, on the basis of aggregated information, whether col­
lected in consolidated form from their subordinates or summarized from the more 
detailed reports they receive "from the field." 
My purpose here is to analyze precisely an intuitively obvious notion: that 
the more aggregated the information available to a supervisor happens to be, the 
more autonomy the individuals he supervises will enjoy. 
Due to the aggregation of controls, multi-level hierarchies, including 
Soviet-type economic administrations, may be far less "centralized" than they 
appear to be from a cursory examination of their command structure. Indeed, 
there is a parallel between decentralization via the aggregation of controls and 
decentralization via the parceling out of linear objective functions that sub-
ordina• t es are inst ructed · l' •to maximize. 
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In this first section, I analyze the relation between a supervisor and a 
single supervisee. In the second, I consider controls over several supervisees. 
In the third, I use an elementary game-theoretic formulation to analyze the 
strategies open to a supervisor and his supervisee, where the former may either 
accept aggregated information or "inspect" (at a cost) and the latter may either 
take advantage of the possibilities opened up by aggregation or behave as if the 
supervisor were actually going to inspect. 
The model about to be described relies heavily on an approach to informa­
3
tion theory developed by Jacob 1"'.iarscha:(
2 and later by Roy Radner, which may be 
summarized as follows in the context of our problem. 
Let Y ={y} denote the set of possibla outcomes of supervisee k's actions. 
We assume all vectors in Y to be in Rn. (The elements of a vector yin Y may, 
for example, be quantities or numbers of n different goods or expenditures cor­
responding to n budget ite1r.s.) :':t is taken that no other individual in the 
system can have more detailed information aDout these outcomes. 
A partition of Y is a set of possible descriptions of the outcomes of k's 
actions. He have just seen that k's information about the outcomes of his own 
actions corresponds to the finest partition {y} of Y, where every element is 
represented separately. Suppose then elements of every vector y are parti-
tioned into q subvectors where q is smaller than n. Consider now subvector y 
i 
of a vector yin Y, defined by this partition denoted~- Let z be the descrip­
tion of k's outcomes in a certain period communicated to a supervisor h. All 
then. elements of yi defined by the finest partition {y} are mapped into a 
J. 




In this paper, the mapping is assumed to be linear. That is, 
ni 
io i h io . 1 . f b io . h. d f" edzi = I 1T. y., were ,r. is e ement Jo su vector 1T , whic is e in byJ J Jj=l 
the same partition r;; of then elements in a vector of 11 aggregation prices" 1r 
0
; 
and y~ is the j'th element of subvector yi (j = l, ... , n.; i = l, .•• , q).
J 1 
Aggregation may be by tonnage or number of items, in which case the elements of 
any subvector ,rio will all be unity; by some indicator of quality (yarn count 
for cloth, calorific value for fuels); or by any conventional price system. 
Any vector yin Y is thus aggregated to a vector z with the aid of an aggre­
gation matrix rr 0 , the rows of which ere obtained by partitioning the set of the 
elements of 1T 0 according to the same r;; already used to define the subvectors of y. 
,-
lo ,rlo 0 
1T 0 . <· 0 0 0 ,rln_ 
.J.. 
0 02o 2o 1T2 
0 00 0 7Tl 1T 
no n~ - or 
0 
0,rqo0 0 0 0 1T n n 
Jq 
We have therefore: 
z = n°y 
where z is an aggregated 7ector in Rq (q < n). 
.,
The main idea use.c.: in this model of the supervision relation is that once 
the elements of yi have been "scrambled" in z. , they cannot be retrieved individu-
1 
I 
ally. Supervis011 h cannot distinguish between z. and z. , as long as they are 
1 l. 
equal, even tho~gh they may have been aggregated from distinct subvectors in y. 
- 4 -
Two examples: (1) yi is a vector of the quantities produced of n. different 
J. 
kinds of steels by a subordinate mill; z. is the combined tonnage of these steels;
l 
the supervisor of the mill (main office of a corporation or a ministry in a cen-
trally managed economic system) receives the message z. from the mill, which it 
l 
cannot unscramble to differentiate the quantities produced of the various kinds 
iof steel. (2) y. is the expenditure on a specific item in a school budget; z. 
J J. 
is the combined expenditure on n. such items. The school superintendent can 
J. 
control z. but not the expenditu1°es on the individual items y~.
J. J 
A supervisor may receive very detailed information from a subordinate but 
be incapable of using it in tr.::.s form. If he has to aggregate yi to z. and if 
J. 
he loses the individual elements y~ in so dc::.,.1g ~ one would be tempted to con­
J 
elude that he might just as well have received the raessage in already aggregated 
form, although it is conceivable that, in situations where supervisees were un-
certain as to how the information might be employed, a superYisor might still 
wish to collect info1"mation in :nore detailed form than he could use. 
We begin with the analysis of the behavior of a supervisor controlling the 
performance of a single supervisee. 
In the present model, it is assumed that a supervisor has preferences P 
(a complete preordering) over all possible outcomes of the activities of his 
supervisee, where these outcomes are described according to the finest partition 
of these outcomes {y}. For reasons that will be spelled out later (which have 
to do with his uncertainty regarding the capabilities of the supervisee), he 
will accept any performance yielding him a minimum UM of satisfaction. To be 
precise, he will accept any vector yin Y at least as desirable as some vector y' 
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4
in an indifference class M. A performance during a given period is "acceptable" 
when the supervisor imposes no penalty on his supervisee and/or takes no action 
to correct his futur•e behavior (in case the environment is expected to stay the 
same in subsequent periods). The "acceptable set" of the supervisor, the set of 
vectors y at least as desirable as any vector in M, is denoted G. This set is 
assumed to be closed. It must also be bounded from below: there always exists 
some vector y with the property y :::._y for ally in G. Finally, I assume non­
satiety: if y' is in G, t:ten any vecto:::·• y such that y :::._ y I must also be in G. 
These three assumptions seem natural and realistic for many situations that might 
be analyzed. 
What criteria of ace:epta~Jility ,,i::;_1 the supervisor apply if the information 
he receives about his sui;ervisee's performance is aggregated? Consider a 
q-dimensional vector ze obtaj_;.:ed by aggregating an n-dimensional vector ye in 
the acceptable se0c G- The supei•visor' will not be able to o.;_stinguish ze from 
e e 
some other vector z with identical elements but aggregated from a vector y 
not in G. The bas5.c assumption of this paper is that the supervisor will accept 
-
ze if he exercises what may be called "aggregated controls," even though he 
would not have accepted ye if he had been able to check on his subordinate's 
disaggregated performance. 
5 As we shall see presently, the supervisor may find, 
if he exercises such aggregated controls, that the performance of his "sector" 
has deteriorated. We will consider this possible deterioration from the super­
visor's point of view in section 3. For the time being, our concern is with 
the possibilities opened up for the supervisee as a result of the aggregation 
of controls. 
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Example: a manufacturer of shoes instructs one of its plants to produce 
at least 50,000 pairs of shoes in the next quarter with an assortment by sizes 
corresponding to last quarter's actual sales. The plant produces 50,000 pairs 
but discreetly violates the assortment order. It is too expensive for the 
manufacturer to check on the assortment. The retail stores receiving the un­
balanced assortment make no complaint because there is a seller's market and it 
is hard to get good shoes. The supervisor cannot act otherwise than accept the 
plant's performance. 
It may be presu.iled that if the costs of obtaining information are high, a 
supervisor will not check on the detailed performance of a supervisee, unless 
he believes that the losses he may be suffering from the latter's failure to 
comply to his detailed orders are great enough to justify the expense of finding 
out what is really going on nbelow deck" (through an audit, a census, or a 
random sample) . 
6 
The formal consequences of the assumption made above is this. Where the 
information reaching a supervisor is aggregated, his acceptable set GR will 
include, in addition to G, any vector y which, upon aggregation to z, will be 
e e
identical with a vector z aggregated from a vector y in G. Formally: 
R I o o e eG = {y n y = n y , ally in G}. 
To fix these ideas, we suppose the supervisee transforms inputs (negative 
elements of y) into outputs (positive elements of y) per period according to a 
routinized technology known to the supervisee but not necessarily, in such detail 
at least, to the supervisor. The se-:: Y contains every feasible vector y. 
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In addition to assuming that this set is closed, I shall also confine my 
analysis to cases where it may be assumed to be convex, thus excluding important 
instances where economies of scale are powerful enough to 11deconvexify11 the 
production set. 
The inputs used in these transformation activities are subject to various 
constraints (on the availability of physical factors of production, of borrow­
able funds, etc.). Some of these constraints are determined by states of the 
environment, the probability distribution of which is assumed to be at least 
approximately known to the supervisee but not to the supervisor. Given a vector 
of constraints win Q, the set of all possible constraint vectors, the vectors y 
are limited to a set Y in a. particular period t where w has occurred ( t = 1, 
()j 
, T). This set is obviously bounded from above, in the sense that there 
exists a vector y such that y .::_y for ally in Y. The set Y is called '~he w 
attainable set, given w.n 
The supervisee is either subject to an incentive plan or pursues one or 
more self-assigned goals. In either case, we assume that he seeks to maximize 
a linear functional 1ry where TT is a vector of non-negative price weights. The 
"vector of incentive prices 11 1r in general will not be identical with the vector 
. . 0 
of aggregat ion prices 1r • 
The elements of 7T may correspond to market prices if the supervisee is 
operating in a market setting and is maximizing profits; bu-the may also mini­
mize his expenditures (i.e. maximize 1r y where y is the subvector of inputs 
in y and 1r- are their corresponding prices) or maximize the value of his output~ 
irrespective of costs.7 Any linear objective function with weights 1r will do. 
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That there must exist at least one maximizer y for TI on Y in all such cases 
w 
is guaranteed by the assumption that Y is closed, which extends to Y, and by
w 
the imposition of constraints on Y. These two conditions together ensure the 
compactness of Y . 
w 
Even though w is a vector of random variables at the time the supervisor 
issues his orders (e.g. sets a "plan 11 ), we take it that the constraints are 
known to the supervisee during the period in which the vectors y are observed. 
Hence he should be capable of finding a maximizer for TI on Y (or at least a w 
vector in Y whic~'1 comes "close n +_:'.) maximizing Tiy in this set) .w 
The intersection of G with Y is denoted Ew. It too is obviously compact.
(;j 
. a aAny maximizer for TI on EuJ 1.s denoted y , Thus Tiy is the maximum value that the 
supervisee 's objective fu~ctLm :"."~!i 2.ssu-:rce if, he wer5=.. compelled to produce in 
the set G. 
We can now offer a :•eason why i:: , the intersection of Y and G, is likelyw w 
to occupy a significant subset of Y , excapt in rare occurrences where the vector 
w 
of constraints is extremely disadvantageous to the supervisee (in case of floods, 
unusual cold or hot spells, etc.). If it is costly for the supervisor to inter­
fere directly in his supervisee 1 s affairs or to levy penalties on him for non­
compliance (fines, dismissal, etc.) ,8 then he must 11set 11 M and hence G in such 
a way that, given almost any constraint vector inn, the supervisee must be 
capable of producing in G, This means that, for a "typical" constraint vector w, 
A 9 
some vectors in G will 1e interior to Y. 
w 
But how can the supervisor set G if he does not have detailed knowledge of 
his supervisee's production capabilities in the latter's most detailed nomenclature? 
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It has to be assumed that, on the basis of occasional inspection, the super­
visor has a sufficiently good idea of the capabilities of his supervisee, under 
typical constraints, to deter'mine what he should accept and what he should reject 
if he did decide to pay t~1e cc-st of obtaining disaggregated information. I assume 
also that either G has bee::1 set before the vector of constraints w has been re­
vealed (i.e. in a pl;:i.nned econo:ny befor•e the plan has gone into effect) or that 
so little information is availab.le to the supervisor about the impact of a 
given won his supervisee 1s capacities that it will have no effect on his mini­
mum requirements. 
From now on, we shall dispense with the subscript w, although it should be 
kept in mind that every set Y and Eis contingent on the occurrence of a random 
vector of constraints w, assumed to rema.in fixed for the period under consideration. 
The autonomy of the supervisee is now defined as the ratio of the value of 
his objective function co::1strained by the necessity of producing a vector y 
acceptable to his superv-isor to the value of his objective function in the ab-
h . · ' 1 • lO -f ' dsense of t 1.s 01•gan1.zat:;.ona_ constraint. .L t he superv1.see were compell e to 
a * * produce in G, hi8 autonomy would be the ratio of TTY to TTY , where y is a maxi-
mizer for ri on Y. We will confine our a~tention to cases where every maximizer 
~·, 
y for ri on Y lies outside E (otherwise the relation between supervisors and 
supervisees wou.ld be so harmonious a.s to be totally devoid of interest).11 




and G are themselves compact) and hence contains at least one maximizer 
for any price system ri. 
oLet us denote by y a mazimize1" for 7i on ER , riyo is then the maximum value 
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of his objective function that a supervisee can attain (given w) when controls 
are exercised in aggregated form. 
Our first task is to figure out whether Tiy0 is greater or just equal to 
wya. (It cannot be smaller, since E, and hence ya, is contained in ER.) 
This problem is tackled in two stages, First we find out what the effect 
on enterprise autonomy would be if the supervisor could not distinguish vectors 
- e e -y and y in Y, where y is in E and y is r..ot, as long as they both aggregated 
o- o eto the same value TI y (=TI y ) . I call this case 11aggregation from n dimensions 
to scalars. n He then go on to partial aggregation of vecto1"S, such that a 
- e o- o e osupervisor cannot distinguish y and y as long as TI y = IT y , where II has more 
than one row. It turns out chat these two cases are linked in a significant way. 
What can be said about ER in the case of aggregation from n dimensions to 
? 'd m , • • ,. o Escalars. Consi er y , a minimizer ror TI on . (Such a minimizer must exist 
since Eis closed and bounded from below.) He now define Em as the set of 
Vecto"""'s y i·n Y such that TI0 y _> rPym. It · t th t Em · 'd · 1~- is easy o prove a is i entica 
From now on, therefore, if we wish to find a maximizer y 0 for ;r on 
ER, we will seek it &~ong the vectors y satisfying the condition 1r0 y ~ 1r 0 ym. 
We first note that if 1r is identical with 1r 0 and, as already assumed, 
* a o * * ify > ey , then 1ry must equal 1ry. · Or, to put the point in another way, y 
13must be in ER and be a maximizer for if on this set. The autonomy of the 
supervisee is complete. This obvious result may be interpreted as follows. 
If the production vectors of the supervisee are aggregated with the help of 
incentive prices or if supervisees 2re subject to an incentive system geared 
to their aggregate output expressed in terir.s of quasi-prices (e.g. if they 
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receive a bonus based on aggregate tonnage produced), then ER must include all 
;': ';':
the maximizers y , whether or not any of these y are included in the set E of 
points that h would consider acceptable under inspection. 
More analytically interesting are the cases where 1T and 71' 0 differ. 
14A proposition, formally proved in a previous paper, is that if (1) Y is 
compact and convex, (2) Try*> Tiya, and (3) Tr0 ya > TI0 ym, then 1Ty0 > 7rya. The new, 
. . o a o m and f undamental assumption, is t1at 7f y > 7f y. To put the assumption different-
aly, the vector y is an interior point of the half space generated by the hyper-
- ...0 'TI a ..plane rr y through y' • This ensures tha-!_: some convex combinations of y and y 
with a positive weight on y* will be in ER. Since all such combinations are worth 
a a ER.more at prices 'IT than y , y cannot be a maximizer for 1T on Hence any maxi-
1T ER t·. f or on must .be- ·'mizer worn more tnan y.a The autonomy of the supervisee has 
15increased as a result of the aggregation r;;. 
Diagram 1 illustrates, in two dimensions, tte nature and extent of the 

















Output of Good l 
Diagram 1 
- 12 -
In Diagram 1 above, Y is represented in the supervisee's disaggregated nomencla-
.•. 
ture. It should be observed that y" is located on a straight-line segment (from 
o' y to L) with a slope equal to that of rr. 
In the absence of any restraints imposed by the supervisor on his output 
-!: 
mix, the supervisee would maximize his payoff rry at y or at any point on the 
·'· 
straight-line segment on which y" is located, If he were obliged to produce an 
output mix: in G, he could do no better than produce at point ya. His autonomy 
-i: 
could then be measured as the ratio OU to Oy. If the supervisor were willing 
to accept any point in E worth as much at aggregation prices rr 
0 as any arbitrary 
point in E, the supervisee would maximize his payoff at y 
0 
, His autonomy would 
OU OV
have increased from 1, to .,, , Such an increase is evidently possible since 
Oy Oy 
0
the basic condition of our first proposition is satisfi~d--rr
0 ya exceeds rr ym 
(e.g. ya is an interior poiLt of the half space generated by the line rr 
0 y 
mthrough y ) • 
Suppose that G, instead of heiug bounded from below by the unbroken curve M 
going through ym and ya were bounded by the curve M' through ym' The payoff 
a, 0 1 -1 
of the supervisee could then be increased from rry to rry At yv he would 
enjoy 100 per cent autoncmy, inasmuch as 1ry
0 
::: rry • From this we conclude that 
om
there is a strictly monotonic (inverse) relation between the ratio 'IT y to 
0 a V O O * 16 
'IT y and the ratio 'ITY ·:o rry , up to the point where rry = 'ITY. In other 
words, the smaller the ratio of the minimum value at aggregation prices of 
-
points in E to tte val~e at these prices of ya, the greater will be the autonomy 
enjoyed by the supervisee . 
.•.3. .. ,11
For given y , y , ;;i.nJ y, this model also allows us to predict the minimum 
increase in autonomy that would result from the aggregation of controls with 
.d f . 0t he ai o prices 'IT . The following p:rioposition is demonstrated geometrically 
17for two goods, but it is easy to prove it algebraically for any number. 
We denote by b the maximum potential increment in the payoff of the super-
visee, starting from a maximizer on E such as ya, if all controls were removed. 
* a o * o a o * 6 is equal to 'ITy - rry • Next we compute 1T y and the differences Tr y - 'IT y 
-
and '!Toya - 'IToym, which are denoted y and o respectively. The proposition is 
that the minimum increment in the supervisee's payoff, irrespective of the cur­
e 1s
vature of (convex) Y, equals - /J.. In other words the fraction of the maximum y 
potential increment in payoff /J. resulting from the aggregation of controls is 
at least}, the ratio of the difference in the value at aggregation prices of 
- a * 








In Diagram 2 above a line has been drawn between points D (y) and K (y ). 
,.. 
Since Y is convex, all the points on this line must be in Y including M, the 
point where this line intersects with the line TI 
0 y through ym. 
-
We first observe that B has the same value at prices TIO as D (ya), C (ym) 
as R, and Q as X. The ratio~ is equal to!~, which in turn equals~~ (propor­
tional segments of lines crossed by parallel lines). Consider now the triangle 
DR DM ( . ,~ • h f h • )DXK. Clearly DX = DK since R11J is parallel to t e base o t e triangle XK • 
DM UV
Shifting to triangle D~<.U, we observe that DK -· UK (since MV and DU both have 
O UV UV d U\" = O h . h hAt he same s1ope TI ) • Thus y - UK = ;;-, an u y' w 1.c. was w at we were 
trying to prove. 
That UV is only a minimum is apparent from Diagr~u 2. If we were to draw 
a line with slope Tio through y 
0
, it woulc. intersect OK considerably to the 
right of V. But we cannot predict the precise location of y. 
0 About all we 
a ~'{
can say is that, given the location of y_ and y_ ~ the efficiency frontier 
of Y, the increment in payoff beyond .2.. /1 will be greater, the greater the curva­
y 
1 • , • a d -:: 18 ture of t h e curve ~inK1ng y an y , 
It is worth noting that the increase in autonomy due to the possibility 
of producing an aggregated vector in GR, as compared to the obligation of pro­
ducing a disaggregated vector in G, is rela·ted to the elasticity of substitu­
tion among the different goods in the supervisor's preference function: the 
smaller this elasticity for any pair of goods, the greater will be the increase 
in autonomy resul-r:ing fron. the supervisor's aggregation of controls. Conversely, 
if goods 1 and 2 in Diagi0 2:n 1 had been related at ym by an infinite elasticity 
of substitution in "':he supervisor I s prefe~...,e::-ices, y 
0 would have been in G, and 
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there would have been no increase in autonomy resulting from aggregation. 
(Autonomy would of course have been greater to begin with.) 
We now turn to the more difficult (and more realistic) problems raised by 
partial aggregation. 
Sufficient conditions for an increase in autonomy are fairly self-evident. 
0 10We begin with a partitioning of 1r into subvectors 1r to ,rqo and a corres­
ponding partitioning of y and ,r. As we have already seen, the i'th row of 
matrix IT0 is a vector of n elements, the i'th subvector of which equals 1T ~ 
consisting of n. 
]. 
elements, and all other elements are equal to zero, and the 
matrix n° maps production vectors inn-dimensional space into vectors in q-
dimensional space (1 < q < n). The acceptable and attainable set under partial 
aggregation is defined as: 
The procedure we are about to follow is this. After locating a given mini­
mizer ya in Ewe pick out a subspace defined by a row of rr 0 --say the i'th--and 
-aconstruct a set containing all the vectors in Y that are identical with y except 
in the i'th subspace. We then look for a vector in this set whose i'th subvector 
is worth more at the prices listed in the i'th subvector of 1T 0 than the i'th sub-
-
vector of ya itself. If this vector exists, we see immediately that it must be 
-
worth more at prices than ya.lg If it does not, we go on to the next subspace 
and eventually investigate every one of the q subspaces to find at least one 
vector with the desired properties, Eventually the procedure may be repeated 
with other maximizers for 1T on E if ya is ~ot unique. A sufficient condition 
for finding a vector ys with the desired properties in some subspace i of the set 
- 15 -
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a 
previously defined (i.e. of the vectors y identical with y , or any other maxi-
mizer for 1T on E, in ever)' subspace but the i 1th) is that 1Tioyia should exceed 
io im · · f h .; 1th f f1T y , where the superscript 1 re ers tote~ subvector o a vector o 
prices or of proc.uction. In ot:1er words, the same condition that allowed us to 
0 
find a vector y 
0 wo1•th more at prices 'IT than ya where rr consisted of a single 
o io i io i ia 
row 1T allows us to find a subv~ctor y such that 1T y > 'IT y This is not 
surprising considering that t:he eJ.emen':s :in every :::ubvector defined by a par­
20 
tition aggregate to a scalar (a single element i:1 the agg"'egated vector). · 
Necessary conditions for 1ry
O 
to exceed mta are even har•der to spell out in 
the case of partial than in the case of aggregation from n goods to a scalar. 
o o a 
We do know, however, that if there does not exist a vector J such that 'TTY > 'TTY 





> 'lTYa. where ER is defined as the se:t o-f points in Y such that 
o o e e _ o n y > n y , for ally in E, and n has more than one row built up from the par-
tition of the same ·rr 
0 
(i;:a.rt~3.l aggregation). This (weak) necessary condition 
for a gain in a~tono~y under partially aggregated controls follows from the 
familiar proposition that if 2. single-constraint maximum problem is broken up 
into two or more separate constraints, the value of the maximand to the new 
problem cannot be greate:i:., ·than what it was for the single-constraint problem. 
Thus if ya is a rnaxim:i.ze:r for ,r on ER generated from a single acceptability con-
a 
straint, there cannot exist a vector worth more than y at prices TI if this 
single constraint is broken up into separate constraints. But if sufficient 
conditions for a gain in autonomy under complete aggregation are satisfied, how 
can we be sure -t_o generate an improvement under partial aggregation? 
- 17 -
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Our first problem is that, even though y , for some subspace i, is located 
io i h , im on t h e hyperp1ane 1T y t rougn y and hence our sufficiency condition does 
not obtain, there may still be points on this hyperplane worth more at prices 
i ia 
1T than y . In this case the analysis in the appendix applies with appropriate 
modifications. But even if we cannot find a y 
0 such that 1ry0 > 1rya in any of 
the q subspaces that we have constructed starting from ya or some other maxi-
mizer for 1T on E, we may still be able to discover such a vector by starting 
maximizer. 
from some vector in E other than a/ Suppose that for some vector ye in E and 
s i is i ie de ds y in Y, it happened that 1T y > .r y in the i 1th subspace (where y = y 
_, . ) is . , s . . ~ )(d r i; J. = 1, . . . , q and y is sucn t 1·1at y is in Y . Now we cannot mechani-
s a e a s
cally claim that 1ry necessarily exc'"eds 1ry , since 1ry < TIY , and hence, 1ry 
. h amay b e sma11er or 1arger --c an 1ry . If we write out the component subvectors of 
e s a y, y, and y , however, we immediately see that, for an improvement to occur, 
i is d i ie .... d ' d"ff b at he d1"fference between 1T y an ,r y mus .. excee tne i erence etween 1ry 
e
and ,ry • 
I could not find the precise condit:i.ons that would permit one to predict 
whether there existed vectors such as ye in E that were superior to ya as 
starting points. 
II. A Supervisor and K Supervisees 
The extension of the analysis in the previous section to a situation where 
a supervisor h has more than one supervisee is fairly straightforward. 
Denoting a supervisee by the subscript k (k = 1, ... , K), we first add 
the constrained production sets of all K supervisees to obtain the joint­
K 
production set of h (i.e. Yh = l Yk). This set must evidently be compact and 
k=l 
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convex if the component sets have these proper":ies. The acceptable set 1i 
intersects with Yh to form the attainable and acceptable set Eh. The set ERh 
is 
now defined as: 
and 
o a a o R 
For nyh to exceed nyh, where yh and yh are maximizers for non Eh and Eh 
respectively, the same sufficient conditions apply as in the case of a unique 
supervisee. The question to be analyzed now is the relation of the autonomy 
of the individual supervisee to any putative increase in the ratio of ny~ to 
anyh for all K supervisees ·i:ogether. 
By the non-satiety '3.G2Um?tion oDly points on the efficiency frontier of Yh 
qualify as possible maximizers :for an:t set o::' positive prices on Eh and Eh
R 
respectively. We first proceed to decompose these efficient subsets, de-
'"' ,.,R
noted Eh and Eh respectively,, into subsets of Y1 to YK. According to a
 basic 
mathematical theorem, if yh is an effid.ent point on a compact set then there 
must exist some semi-positive vector of prices p such that pyh ~ pyh for all 
yh in Yh. By another theorem on sets formed as the sum of compact sets, if 
K 
21 
yh = I yk' then pyk > pv, for all yk in Y, (k =1, ... K). Thus, by the - -'K K ' k=l 




decomposed into K efficient points of Y to YK. Let Ek and Ek stand for the1 
efficient sets fork obtained, respectively, from the decomposition of Eh and 
E~. It follows also from the theor'em just cited that if ya and y 0 are maximizers 
,... ,..._R a o '"'D ---DR
for non Eh and Eh then yk and yk must be maximi.zers for non Ek and Ek respec-
tively (k = 1, ... • K). 22 
- 19 -
o aThe fact that riyh > rryh > ,ryh implies that at least one supervisee must 
gain autonomy from the aggregation of controls. But it is easy to construct 
an example where h has two supervisees k and i such that rry~ = rry:, even though 
such, in other words, that the entire gain would 
accrue to L This w!.11 be the case if i can shift from y: toward a more advan­
tageous product mix (presumably in the direction of the mix represented by y:) 
without incurring substantia~ly higher marginal costs, whereas any attempt by 
k to increase its payoff would face steeply rising marginal costs. 









'"'D "D . •
In this diagram Ek and EQ, are indicated by heavy lines on the efficiency fron-
tiers of Yk and Yi respectively. As a result of the aggregation of controls, 
the point yh
0 becomes admissible for the joint production of k and i. The area 
opened up bet ween yh an 




o Supervisee k, on th2 other hand, cannot increase his 
-
autonomy--his maximizer for TI remains at y~. The reason is clearly that, because 
of the sharply increasing relative mar~inal cost of producing good 1 fork, any 
combination of a point -co the right of y:- and a point between y:- and y~ would 
yield a joint production y, ttat would :fa.11 inside the efficiency frontier of h.n 
While it does not strain the imagination to assume that a unique super-
visee might, afte1' sorae ::xperirr.entation, figure out the gener'al pattern of his 
supervisor's p:'.'.'eferences , it is hard to believe that several supervisees would 
not only have this knowledge but be able ·::-o locate points such as y: and y~ for 
various possible degrees of aggregation o~ controls (of which more will be said 
presently). Even if a plan or target were set by h for each of its supervisees 
and all the individual targets were known to each supervisee, this would only 
give k a first approximation to the location of these critical points. He 
would also have to have information on how orders or "plans" were being fulfilled 
by each co-supervisee. Indeed, if the penalties for a failure on the part of 
all K supervisees to produce a joint vector in G--which presumably contains the 
aggregate target as we2.1 as tolerable deviations the:..~efrom--were very heavy, 
there would be a strong indu~ement ~or the supervisees to exchange information 
and collude to avoid this traLJsgression. It might even pay tin the situation 
depicted in Di2grarn 3 to transfer to '.-c a :)art of its ir..creased payoff in exchange 
- 21 -
-a
for k's agreement to 11stay put 11 at yk. This strategy would only make sense of 
course if 2 had reason to believe that h would not impose detailed controls on 
the output mix and would be content to assess the performance of k and 2 in its 
aggregated nomenclature. 
III. An Inspection Game 
In this concluding section, we shall ignore the special information problems 
arising from a multiplicity of supervisees and analyze the relation between a 
supervisor and his supervisees as if the latter behaved as a single decision­
making entity k. The problem I wish -t::o consider is the following. Suppose that 
the supervisor has a choice of the degree o~ aggregatic~ of controls that it can 
impose on its supervisees. The finer the controls--the greater the disaggregation 
of production vectors--which the supervisor wishes to impose, the higher the 
information cost he must pay. On the other hand, the supervisees are aware that 
for each degree of aggregation, there is a different joint payoff; they may report 
their performance according to a.ny of the degrees of aggregation or "channels" 
both they and the supervisor can communicate in, but they risk the chance of a 
penalty if they choose production vectors on the assumption that the supervisor 
will exercise controls in a more aggregated form than the one he will actually 
opt for (if he decides to 11inspect"), Given the production and aggregation 
strategies available to the "players 0 --the supervisor and the colluding super­
visees--we seek to throw light on the general ~haracter of the solutions that 
may be expected to games with this format. 
But first I have a preliminary observation to make on the supervisor's 
strategy of aggregation. We have seen that, ceteris paribus, the smaller the 
-- 22 -
elasticity of substitution between pairs of commodities in G, aggregated in GR, 
the greater will be the increase in payoff open to the supervisee(s) upon aggre­
gation. Suppose that we could measure the supervisor's loss, corresponding to 
the supervisee's potential gain in autonomy resulting from the admissibility of 
-
a vector y~ in GR compared toy~ in G, as the difference in the supervisor's 
-a o
utility associated with the indifference classes containing yh and yh respectively. 
This loss will clearly be smaller if the supervisor can partition the set of 
n goods in such a way that pairs of goods related by a high elasticity appear 
in the same subvector and pairs with a lowe:::- elasticity in different subvectors. 
The headquarters of the shoe plant already cited in an earlier example might 
want to include in a list of goods for potential aggregation (if detailed con­
trols are not exercised) men's shoes of the same size though of different 
patterns and styles, on the presumption that the elasticity of substitution 
among shoes of different styles but of the same size would be higher than be­
tween shoes of the same style but of different size. Similarly, if the head 
of a trust or Soviet-type association supervising different coal mines had 
preferences reflecting the specialized demands of its customers, it would aggre­
gate coals by calorific value or other demand indicator rather than according 
to geological er mineral characteristics that would affect primarily production 
costs. If a higher degree of aggregation were desired, any two subvectors v and 
w resulting from the first partition might be aggregated, provided the goods 
entering into v had a relatively h:igier elasticity of substitution with goods 
entering w than in the case of pairs of goods in subvectors that would be aggre­
gated in different aggregates of subvectors. 
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Consider again two partitions of then goods in a production vector, one 
obtained as a coarsening of the other. As in the first section, the super­
visee produces at ya if he seeks to maximize nis payoff and satisfy his super­
visor in te!'ms of his disaggregated preferences d .. e. ya is a maximizer for 1r in 
G) and at y0 if he wishes only to satisfy his supervisor's aggregated preferences 
o ~R)(i.e. y is a maximizer for 'IT on ,.~ . Assume that sufficient conditions for an 
o a
increase in, autonomy are met and that 'TTY > -rrY. Clearly, .!E.. terms of the super-
visor's disaggregated preferences, his level of satisfaction at y0 , denoted u-, 
-
is lower than that attained at ya, denoted Um. (In Diagram J., the lower level 
corresponding to u0 is shown as a dottec in.difference cu!'ve passing through y 0 .) 
Now for the gan1e to be of any inte!'est (and to make any sense), supervisor h 
must pay a cost, expressible in utility foregone, to obtain the detailed infor­
mation corresponding to the finer of the two partitions (for if the additional 
information were free, he would always "inspect.a). Call the decrement in 
utility level associa.ted with this cost of infor·mation I. We now introduce a 
reward R, 23 whi6.1 will be conferred on the supervisee if the supervisor finds 
~ inspection that his sup,.;rvisee k has produced a vector in G, and a penalty T, 
which will be imposed on kif he finds that k has produced in GR but not in G 
(as if controls were in fact aggregated). 
We assume that Rand Tare fixed, irrespective of the extent to which com­
pliance may have been easy or difficult to achieve fork or of the extent of 
transgression by k of h 1 s directives. To ::iegin with, we also assume that the!'e 
is a unique vector of resou!'ce constraints w. 
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The payoff matrix of the game is give:1 below. 
Supervisor;s choice of channel 
/---------__....,....._~ 
Aggregated Disaggregated 
(no inspection) (inspection) 
(81) (82) 
As if controls 





decision As if controls 




(a.2) _____________._ ________, 
Let us first assume that the game is going to be p].ayed. only once. Then it is 
evident that h's second strategy e is dominatec by the first 81 : unless2 
information costs are negl:.gitI.e, it would not pa:; h to inspect , since, irres-
a C
pective of k's decision to produce at y or at y , h 1 s utility level would be 
lower than if he had chosen not to inspect. But if k knows that I is non­
negligible in terms of h's utility level, he will guess that h will play e1 ; 
he should therefore play a. . His payoff w.Hl be Tiy
0 and h's will be U-.
1 
But a supervisor-supervisee relation is not a one-shot affair. It is 
embedded in the rules of organizations, which are normally endowed with acer­
tain degree of continuity, if not of permanence. Let us therefore suppose that 
the same game is repeated a number of times. If his concerned with his total 
(or average) utility over time, it may now be rational for him to play e on2 




the larger T and Rand the smaller I, the more likely his going to be success-
ful in "teaching" k that his first pure strategy will not pay. 
At this point we may ask what mixed strategy k can adopt that will guaran­
tee him the highest "security level"--the largest minimum--payoff he can expect 
if h tried to punish him by adopting the strategy that would minimize his (k's) 
24payoff. 





is shown in the d:i.agrai"TI below. -
Try0 
_... 




The payoffs associated with each pure strategy pair are shown on the 
vertical lines above (1,0) and (0,1). ':'he 0 line exhibits a.11 the convex1 
combinations of the payoffs Try0 and Trya associated with different combinations 
of k's strategies a.1 and a2 when h 1-lays s1 . The s2 li:r.e is similarly defined 





, x ) of any point x are the weights attached to
2 
a and a in a convex combina.tion of thes,~ two strategies.
1 2 
If k chooses a mixed strategy (x1 , x ) in the interval X~l), then h's2 
best response, on the assumptions made above, is s • The vertical distance
2 
from any point (x
1
, :x. } ( suc£1 as the one shown in the diagram) to the 13 line
2 2 
represents k's security level. The interval of the 8 line corresponding to
2 




is in x~ 2), then h's best response is r3
1 
. The interval of the i3l line corres-
d • . t . X(
2 ) 1 . h .pen ing to poin s in k a so appeal"S in .e.c.7y type. The Lighest security 
. \ 
level vis clearly attained at the point x(o,, where the two lines cross. 
· · · f • . d ( opt xopt)Using this observation to solve or the opt:;.maJ. mixe strategy x , ,1 2 
f . d - opt R , opt _ T we in that = R+'f anu - R+T • Pis we would have expected, the greaterx1 x 2 
T relative to R, the more often k should play a if he wishes to protect him­2 
self 
; 
from h's punitive strategy, if R were zero, this maxirn:in strategy would 
induce k to play a exc.J.usively, thus limiting his payoff to 1rya.
2 
v, the minimum payoff k can expect if he adopts the mixed strategy 




)R + ( r.ya)T 
R + T 
av av O a
It is easily verified that aR > O ar:d aT < 0, as long as rry > 1ry. 
What should ;i do to maximize his utility if he we1,e to observe that k 




. But then k should 1,evert "co the "8Ur\S strategy x: and h will be
1 
worse off. The only hope for h ,~11 2.n 2x·cended game is to play f3 often enough
2 
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fork to form the impression that h fo more in-::erested in punishing him for 
transgressions than in immediately maximizing his (h's) utility. This impres­
sion will be fortified if Tis relatively low and weakened if it is high, for 
h will not be willing to adopt a strategy dominated in a game limited to a 
single play if he is likely to incur a heavy immediate loss in so doing (unless 
the penalty for transgression is so heavy that k naed only be reminded on rare 
occasions that h is capable of playing 02). 
Let (y1 , y ) denote any of h's mi:zed strategies. Suppose y2 to be the2 
· ·minimum 1eve1 of 15n requir-eu• ~ to· ~1nduce .kto seeK· cover am1... p1ay (xopt , opt) •2 1 x2 
Then h's average payoff will be: 
- R -
w = (1-y )(~)U - + (l-y )(_!-)lfl + y <--){\1 - I) + - (_!__)(Om - I) = 2 R+T 2 R+T 2 'R+T , Y2 R+T 
_::~ u- _!_ Un+ - IY2R+T R-1-T 
Thus h's average payoff will be a convex combination of U- and Um with 
weights R!T and R:T' minus a fraction of inspection costs I equal to the propor­
tion of the plays where h has resorted to his second strategy. 
That T should be as great as possible to maximize h's utility is self-
·a 26evi ent. It is perhaps not so intuitive that the reward for (revealed) com-
pliance should be as low as possible if this goal is to be achieved. 
A stochastic vector of input constraints may now be re-introduced. As in 
the first sections, we assume that (1) Mis invariant to the particular input 
constraintsthat k is actually faced with in a given period 1 (2) G is known to k 
with certainty, ar.d (3) R a!cd Tare fixed scalars, invariant to any of the 
- 28 -
variables in the problem. Given the first of these assumptions, it does not 
seem to matter, in playing h:i.s game, ho,;,; mi.:.ch or how little h may know about 
k l b·1· . 27s capa 1. 1.ties. 







In the case illustrated, w 1 is a more favorable config1 ration of input con­
straints than w, allowing an expansion from Y(w) to Y(w'). It happens here 
that y~w') is included in GR so that aggregation of controls, in case w' crops 
up, enables k to attain 108 per cent autonomy. This is of course accidental. 
While the payoff of k will necessarily increase if 00 1 occurs rather than w, 
the autonomy ratio may actually dec~ease (if, fer example, the slope of the 
- 29 -
efficiency frontier of Y(w 1 ) were appreciably sn·.aller above 1r
o 
y through y 
m 
and greater below that line). Neither is there any way of ascertaining a priori 
a a 
whether 1ry(w) is larger or smaller than 1ry(w 1 ) 
0 0 
1ry(w) ny(w,) 
Whichever is larger, however, should make little or no difference to the 
choice of strategies that k and hare likely to adopt, since, whether w occurs or 
w' , 13 will be dominated by 13 and the maximizing strategy of k will still be2 1 -R T The latter point is evident from the fact that neither 1ry0 nor 'ITYa(R+T 'R+T). 
appear in the solution to the problem of maximizing v. 3ince R, T, and I are 
fixed, there are no new factors to affect the behavior in a repeated game of 
either k or h. I conjecture, therefore, that under these assumptions the 
relative frequency of inspection (13 ) in an optional s~rategy for hover an2 
indefinite number of periods will be the same :for any vector of constraints to 
28which k may be subject. 
I shall not dwell on the case, already alluded to in the beginning of this 
m paper, where h decides on his minimum acceptable level of utility U after 
observing w or, more generally, after observing k;s capabilities. The super­
visor may, for example , set Urr: in such a way that k can only produce in G if 
his vector of constraints is exceptionally favorable; then when a typical con-
straint vector such as crops up, k is forced to cite "objective difficulties" 
for his failure to comply with h's orders. If his not willing to accept just 
about any performance backed up by such 11 excuses," he must pay additional costs 
to obtain the informat!_on necessa1"y to check on these objective difficulties. 
This may be extremely -:costly, especia.:i.ly for- a highly disaggregated product mix. 
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That contingent controJ_s of this sort a1°e at ·times applied in command economies 
of the Soviet type may hav,J to do with the fact that rnuch internal information 
about the production capacities of producing units are routinely passed on to 
their superiors at frequent intervals so that the incrementa.l costs of obtaining 
information to check on excuses for transgressing directions may be fairly low. 
It is generally 1"ecognized tba-:.: pressure on subo:r.dinates to coax out maximal 
performance--feasibl.e only under unusual.ly favor•ablc circumstances--is dimin-
. h. . h 29Ois ing int ese econom~es. If so, the asswrptior: of an invariant G may be-




The linear programming formulation of the maximizing and minimizing 
problems considered on pages 11-42 can be represented as follows: 
. 0 max rry or min rr y 
subject to: 
-Cy < -c 
By< b 
y. > 0 (j = 1, ... , n)
J 
where C is an m x n matrix and can m-dirnensional vector of non-negative 
coefficients, and B is an r x n matr:~x and b an r-dimensional vector of non­
negative coefficients (n > 2). 
-
a dmb, ·- h( ) . ...Let y an y otn satis::y t .e m + r. constraints; ya is a maximizer 
m •.. ~ o S oa om
f or 1r and y a minimizer ror ,r • uppose rr v = 1T y • 





o o e 
-1T y < -rr y 
where ye is any vector satisfying the (m + r) constraints of the first 
problem. 
a · h · 1Yo 1·s maximizer· .Lor.c tis prob· em. We reintroduce the assumption made 
earlier that E consis~s of more than o7e point. ~onsider the hyperplane rr0 y 
- 3:2 -
through ym and denote by y the set of ally on this hyperplane. If ya and ym 
0 0 are distinct (if they are i.10t, see below), t~1en the condition 1r y > 1r y for all 
O 0yin. E ( except y ~ ym) cannot hold (since. not on1y 'IT ° ya =Trym = 'IT y" but a11 
convex combinations of ya and ym are on this hyperplane). It follows that 
either 1) one of then inequations defining G, say the j 1th, has the same or 
• 1 ,..f · · h 1 t · 0 2) yrn and ya J., i'e • thproportiona_ coer icients as t e e_emen s in 'ff or in e 
intersection of two or more of the constraj_n:_: equations defining G~ neither of 
which have coefficients; eq1_1al or p:-eoportiona.J. to the elements in '!To. If 1), 
o a
then a necessary and ~:icif icieni.: condi-:: ion for 'ITY > 1ry is that at least one 
of the n inequat:;.01s dc.:i:ining G other thaT'. the j 1th s~·.,ould ~1ave a positive 
a
shadow price for the >asis co:-.0 r1es1Jon<iing toy (i.e. should be just satisfied). 
Proof: If there is no othe:. binding const::->aint in G, every vector in Y located 
on 'IT On y must have been in E, Hence ya must tea maximizer for 'IT on ER as well 
as on E, and there cannot exist a y0 in :SR such that 1rv0 > 11ya. If, however, 
there was another bind:.ng constraint in -:; at the point ya, then clearly an 
increase in the value of the maximand rry would have been possible if this 
constraint had been rerr:oved, This constraint is, by definition, absent in ER. 
Hence at least one vector worth more at prices rr than ya can be found in ER. 
. . o R •All maximizers y for TT on E must be worth at least as much at prices 'IT as 
o athis vector, :-Ience 1ry > TTY 
If 2) , we have at least two 0£ t}1e inequations defining G strictly satis­
fied at ya. AlJ. the r,oints y on 1T0 y th1°ough ym and ya are either such that 
ay ~ aya or such that- dy ~-- c.y 0 , where a and d are respectively row-vectors of 
coefficients of the j'th and d 1th inequa.tions that are just satisfied at ya. 
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The above inequat5.ons folJ.ow from the fact that the only points such that 
-
dd ,a . h .. fG d' f be on t heay > aya ~ y > ay are in t1 e interior o an tnere ore cannot 
minimizing hyperplane w 
Qr, 
y. Hence if either of the inequations have a positive 
0yshadow price and the constraint to that inequation is relaxed, points on w 
satisfying the remaining constraints wiJ.J. be opened up that will be worth more 
• h aat prices tan y. 
Finally, if y2. and ym are identical and E consists of more than one point, 
-athen y must be located at the intersectiori. of two or more hyperplanes defined 
by the inequati::ms defining G. It suffices tha-:: tl1ese inequations should have 
positive shadow prices f0r the p-r>oposition in 2) above to go th11ough. 
note that it is nalmost but not quite" necessaryReturning to case 1), we 
for two of the inequat:ions defining G to have positive shadow prices. We 
.,. 
could have a situatj_on where 1) y" was identical with y 
0 and 2) the inequation 
with the coefficients proportional to the elem~nts of ·rr 
0 had a zero shadow 
. o . a . , . could stil 1 exceed wy , even tnoug11 only one other constraintprice, but 1ry 
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than 
in G. More frequent inspection might be required/under the behavior conditions 
spelled out in the model developed in the text. To determine whether it would 
pay the supervisor to adopt the strategy of restricting the autonomy space of 
supervisees when his controls were aggregated, however, would demand a more 
detailed specification of the costs of inspection and of interference than the 
present model provides. 
6on the superYisor's possible strategies for maximizing his utility, see 
below, section 3. 
7If the supervisee is rewarded for 100 per cent fulfillment of his targets 
but gets nothing reore for overfulfillment, his behavior cannot be represented 
by a linear objective function. It also strains belief to assume, in case 
his performance should depend on his exertions, that his effort can be incor­
porated as an input ~ith a fixed weight in his objective function. For a model 
incorporating alte!"native assumptions, see Michael Keren, "On the Tautness 
of Plans," Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming. 
8On the "power" of 
' the supervisor over his supervisee and its relation 
to the cost to the former of imposing penalties, see below, section 3. 




a less favorable constraint vector 00 1 would be likely to generate a production 
"" set Yw, that did not intersect with G at all. 
101 will not dwell on the interesting question, raised by Geoffrey Heale 
in a recent discussion, as to whether a definition of autonomy should not in­
clude some notion of increased choice, ir~espective of whether the new options 
available enable a supervisee to increase the value of his maximand. My own 
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feeling is that the widening of the set of options in order to be valued by 
the supervisee , must ~ under certain circumstances at least , lead to a higher 
value of his maximand. It would not, in any case, be an easy matter to define 
autonomy in terms of opportunity sets in such a way that two situations could 
be compared and their relative degree of autonomy cardinally measured. 
11The reader may wonder whether it is realistic to represent a situation 
where a supervisor can decide -~1hat a supervisee should do, at least in aggre­
gated terms, hut cannot set ~pan incentive system that will induce him auto­
matically to perform according to his desires. For one thing, immediate super­
visors in many organizations ~~e not free to determine either the incentive 
system according to which ~heir supervisees are rewarded nor the price systems 
that are used to evaluate their performance. The elaboration of an incen­
tive system that will be equitable when appl:i.ed to a significant number of 
subordinates in an organization and that will induce all of these subordinates 
to perform in a desirable manner is a formidable task which goes much beyond 
the narrow range of problems discussed in this paper. Another consideration 
is that, if the supervisor does have control over the incentive system for his 
supervisees, the performance of the latter may be subject to appreciable fluc­
tuations (e.g. in the volume and composition of his output) due to random 
exogenous constraints, so that it may be very difficult for the supervisor 
to set incentives in such a way that supervisees will be induced to produce 
in an acceptable set at all times. 
12E • (1) b h " ~· ' . f ER,in. ~R is in. , t e e1e:n.n1tion overy vector y .r., . Em since , y 
. E d ( ) o a o ·,n h d f. . . 
,r o-y = 1Toya where y a is. some vector in ~ an 2 'IT y ~ 1r y by t e e im.tion 
h f . . . ...:1m d h o- o :m l . . ~ . h in1t1on of vectors in. Em •of y, an ence 'IT y ~ 1T y , w1ic satisries tie ~e 
- -
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b ·t + . Em 1 b . RI nowshow that an ar 2 rary vector y in must a so e in E • By the 
f . . . f Em o + o m 
o + o m + R
de inition o , ,r y .:_ TI y. Suppose ,r y = TI y. Then y is in E , since 
m • • G - . l o + omy is in , A~ternative y, suppose TI y > TI y. Since both sides of the in-
o + omequality are scalars, this can be written ,r y = dir y where dis a constant 
. o + 0 (d m) B d m b h . .l h y = 'IT y . ut y, y tenon-satiety assumption,arger tan unity or ,r 
0must be in G. Thus if we substitute dym for ya and ir0 for rr in the defini-
tion of GR above, we see that y+ must be in GR. Since y+ , by assumption, is 
in Em, it must be in Y. If y+ is in GR and in Y , it must be in ER, the w w 
intersection of these two sets. 
o -1: o m13Proof: iry* .:_ TIYm by the definition of y*. Then n y ~ ,r y, since, 
0 ,..,, f b h d f" . . f Emby assumption, TI= n. ~Dere ore, y t e e 1n1t1on o , y is in that 
set, and hence in ER. is a maximizer for non Y, it must also be 
a maximizer on ER, a subset of Y. This result does not depend on the con­
vexity of Y. No·:::e , however , that it does not necessarily hold for aggregation 
from n to q, where q > 1 (see footnote 20). 
14J. M. Montias, op. cit., Appendix B. 
lSTh d. . o a o m • h 2 b t h . 1econ ition 7r y > 1T y is necessary wen n = , u, wen n 1s equa 
R o m
to three or more goods, vectors in E located on the plane TI y through y 
(or ya) may be found that are worth more at prices n than ya. I was only able 
to find necessary conditions for Tiyo to exceed ny a in case n > 2 under con-
ditions where Y can be taken to conform to a linear technology and G can be 
defined as the set of points Cy.:_ c where C is an m x n matrix and c is an 
m-dimensional vector 0£ non-negative coefficients (see Appendix). 
- -
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16 a a'As long as y (respectively y ) is an interior point of the half space 
1 
generated by n°y through ym (respectively through ym ), the basic condition of 
·t· l . . f" - ( o a om . o a1 om') h o aproposi ion is satis 1ea TI y > 1r y ana TI y > TI y sot at ny > ny 
o' a'{respectively ny > ny ). The upper limit to this improvement is of course 
set by the condition where the maximizer for 1r on ER is worth as much at prices 
* o'
TI as y (e.g. y in the diagram is the upper limit in this case). 
17By definition~, defined in the next paragraph in the text, equals 
0 a Om y 
TI Y_ - 1T Y Since Y is convex and 1r 0 ya > n°ym > n°y*, there must exist a 
o a o 1: 
n Y - TI y 
convex combination yb of ya and y* on n°y through ym. 
in the above expression: 
0 a 0 b
0 1i y - 7T y 
y ·l:0 a 0 
1T y - 1T y 
-
~·~ aBy definition~= ny - 1ry The payoff corresponding to yb is 1ryb. The 
. ' ff d . • b aincrement in payo· ~e to aggregation is ny - ny. The critical ratio of 
the increase in payoff from aggregation to the maxil!!um possible increment is 
..,Yb a .,,.o a .,,.oyb 
II - ny to II y IITo show that this ratio is equal ---------, we need only note 
* a a a o * 
ny - ny 1r y - 1r y 
that we have here the ratios of two aggregates at different prices of the same 
a b - ~•· 
vectors with elements (yj - yj) and (yj - yj) respectively (j = 1, . • . ' n). 
A familiar proposition from index-number theory tells us that the ratio of all 
such aggregates must be equal, irrespective of price weights. The equality of 
the two ratios allows us to conclude that nyb - nYa equals£.. 11· 
y 
18If there is a set of maximizers for 1r on Y rather than a unique maximizer 
(as in Diagrams 1 a:1.d 2), then the measure~ will depend on which of the 
- 39 -
maximizers are chosen on this set of maximizers. The largest value of -
t5 A,
y 
and the one making the most sense, will be obtained by choosing any maximizer 
for 'IT on Y that maximizes the value 'IT 
0 y. 
19call this vector ys and its subvectors in the i'th and j'th subspaces 
yis and yjs. Since Tiiyis > 1riyia and Tijyjs = 1rjyja (j ¢ i; j = 1, ... , q), 
·t f 11 h s > Tiy.a 
20ror detai· 'ls, see '1r ont·1as, _op. c1"t . It should be observed that 
* 
1 o ows tat ny 
if 'IT and 'IT 0 are identical, it is not necess2rily true that y will be in ER 
when q > l. For this proposition to hold, we must have: 
i i,': ..,.i im
1ry :::_uy 
( e • .... h h m •f or every subvector J. · f rom l to q. Any vector y in r. ot er t an y satis-
fying the set of q re:~ations will also do . ) If we substitute 'IT 
io on both 
o,•; om 
sides of the above inequation (i = q), we see that TI y ~ TI y and 
that y* must be in ER. 
21This follows from Theorem I.2 in T. C. Koopmans's, Three Essays on the 
State of Economic Science, New York, Toronto and London, 1957, p. 12. 
a22consi'der a price· syst em pana a vect or yha such that pyh :::_ pyh for all y 
K - -
in E and py: ~ pyk for all yk in Ek (k = 1, , I y: = y:.K), where 
- k=l 
(k = 1, • • • , K).By the definition_of Ee, y: must be in this set for every k 
-
a a ,. 11 k • a · · · f "ED SupposeClearly, eyk 2.. 'IT'Yk :ror a , wnere yk 1.s a maximizer or 'if on k. 
. ~ a a 
t hat f or some supervisee :~, 1ry.Q, < ny9.,. Then, summing over all supervisees, 
- = = K = a a a , a aBy the theorem already cited, yh must beeyh < eyh, where yh eq~als. ~l yk. 
'"'DJ< ,....D 





But the last inequality contradicts the assumption that yh is a maximizer 
D
for ,r on Eh. This proves that 1TY: = .ry: for all k and hence that y: is a 
maximizer for 1T on EkD for all k. The same reasoning can be applied to prove 
o b . . f ,,DR f 11 kh ea maximizer on Lk or a .tat yk must or 1T 
23This reward may be quite small relative to 1Tya and to T, but it would 
be unrealistic to suppose that k would derive no advantage from an inspection 
tnat had uncove1"ed no serious deviatio:1 of performance from orders. 
24rn this non-zero-sum game, such a strategy would not necessarily be 
optimal for h. But is is relevant because it places limits on h's ability to 
punish k for· adopting ct, at least part of the time and thereby to "teach" him 
..L 
not to transgress his orders. 
25The diagram is adapted from R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions; 
IntI'oduction and c1,iti.cal Survey, New Yor}'( and London, 1957, Appendix 3, 
pp. 394-97. 
26A more complex and realistic model would coLsider the cost to h of 
imposing a penalty on k (e.g. the manager o= k might resign and it might be 
costly to replace hi:n). Such a consideration, ceteris paribus, would tend to 
limit T. For a more general model of power in hierarchies incorporating the 
cost to h of imposing penalties on k, see John Harsanyi, 11 Measurement of Social 
Power" in Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior, M. Shubik, ed., 
New London and Sidney, 1964, pp. 183-206. While this is the only reference 
to Harsanyi 's paper, I sh01.11d-· acknowledge its general influence over the con­
ceptual approach adopte-1 in this paper. 
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27 we recall that h needs to :<now something a!JOUt n ={w} and about k's 
technology in order to sc.t Mat a level that will permit k to produce in G 
"most of the time." The greater the cost to h of imposing a penalty on k for 
not producing in G, the greater the likelihood that Mwill be set in such a 
way as to enable k to produce in G, for almost any win n, if he wishes to 
do so. 
28The possibility of an exception to this general principle should be 
recognized in case w1 c~anged the constz•ained production set in such a way 
as to cause a relatively .iarge difference in tI1e ratios 
a a 
rry( 'ffV 1 I)W,'\ J \ wand 
0 0 
1TY(u) "Yi\W'·) 
For, while k's rnaximin st."'a·:egy wculd not be affected, the de:::irability of 
adopting it against an occa::;:i.onal play of h's second strategy might differ 
in the two situations: k :night take mo:oe c;1ances-···Le. play a.. more often 
J. 
than the maximum strategy would dictate--in situations where Jifferencesbe-
o d a .tween TI'Y an_ -rry were except1.onally large. 
29See the tliscussion in Michael Keren, op. cit. 
